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Abstract
We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic
variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not.
Two strategic variables are ti’s and si’s for i = A, B,C. Mainly we will show the following
results.
1. The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s is equivalent to the equilibrium when
Players A and B choose ti’s and Player C chooses sC as their strategic variables.
2. The equilibrium when all players choose si’s is equivalent to the equilibrium when
Players A and B choose si’s and Player C chooses tC as their strategic variables.
The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s and the equilibrium when all players choose
si’s are not equivalent although they are equivalent in a symmetric game in which all
players have the same payoff functions.
Keywords: partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game, Nash equilibrium, two strate-
gic variables
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1 Introduction
We consider a three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Three players are
Players A, B and C. Two strategic variables are ti and si, i = A, B,C. They are related by
invertible functions. The game is symmetric for Players A and B in the sense that they have
the same payoff functions. On the other hand, Player C may have a different payoff function.
Thus, the game is partially asymmetric. In Section 3 we will show the following main results.
1. The equilibriumwhen all players choose ti’s is equivalent to the equilibriumwhen Players
A and B choose ti’s and Player C chooses sC as their strategic variables.
2. The equilibrium when all players choose si’s is equivalent to the equilibrium when
Players A and B choose si’s and Player C chooses tC as their strategic variables.
An example of three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables is a relative profit
maximization game in a three firms oligopoly with differentiated goods. See Section 4. In that
section we will show;
1. The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when
Players A and C choose ti’s and Player B chooses sB as their strategic variables.
2. The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when
Players A and B choose si’s and Player C chooses tC as their strategic variables.
3. The equilibrium when all players choose si’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when
Players A and B choose ti’s and Player C chooses sC as their strategic variables.
4. The equilibrium when all players choose si’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when
Players A and C choose si’s and Player B chooses tB as their strategic variables.
5. The equilibrium when all players choose ti’s is not equivalent to the equilibrium when
all players si’s.
In a symmetric game, in which all players have the same payoff functions, they are all
equivalent1.
In the next section we present a model of this paper and prove a preliminary result which is
a variation of Sion’s minimax theorem.
2 The model
We consider a three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Three players are
Players A, B and C. Two strategic variables are ti and si, i = A, B,C. The game is symmetric
for Players A and B in the sense that they have the same payoff functions. On the other hand,
Player C may have a different payoff function.
1Hattori, Satoh and Tanaka (2018).
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ti is chosen from Ti and si is chosen from Si. Ti and Si are convex and compact sets in linear
topological spaces, respectively, for each i ∈ {A, B,C}. The relations of the strategic variables
are represented by
si = fi(tA, tB, tC), i = A, B,C,
and
ti = gi(sA, sB, sC), i = A, B,C.
( fA, fB, fC) and (gA, gB, gC) are continuous, invertible, one-to-one and onto functions. When
Players A and B choose tA and tB and Player C chooses sC, then tC is determined according to
tC = gC( fA(tA, tB, tC), fB(tA, tB, tC), sC).
We denote this tC by tC(tA, tB, sC).
When Players A and B choose sA and sB and Player C chooses tC, then tA and tB are
determined according to {
tA = gA(sA, sB, fC(tA, tB, tC))
tB = gB(sA, sB, fC(tA, tB, tC)).
We denote these tA and tB by tA(sA, sB, tC) and tB(sA, sB, tC).
When all players choose sA, sB and sC, tA, then tB and tC are determined according to
tA = gA(sA, sB, sC), tB = gB(sA, sB, sC), tC = gC(sA, sB, sC).
Denote these tA, tB and tC by tA(sA, sB, sC), tB(sA, sB, sC) and tC(sA, sB, sC).
The payoff function of Player i is ui, i = A, B,C. It is written as
ui(tA, tB, tC), i ∈ {A, B,C}.
We assume
ui : T1 ×T2 ×T3 ⇒ R for each i ∈ {A, B,C} is continuous on T1 ×T2 ×T3. Thus, it
is continuous on S1 × S2 × S3 through fi, i = A, B,C. It is quasi-concave on Ti and
Si for a strategy of each other player, and quasi-convex on Tj, j , i and S j, j , i
for each ti and si.
We do not assume differentiability of the payoff functions.
Symmetry of the game for Players A and B means that in the payoff function of each player,
Players A and B are interchangeable. Since the game is a zero-sum game, the sum of the values
of the payoff functions of the players is zero.
We assume that all Ti’s are identical, and all Si’s are identical. Denote them by T and S.
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous
function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological
spaces, and let f : X × Y → R be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first
variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable, then
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
f (x, y) = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
f (x, y).
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We follow the description of Sion’s theorem in Kindler (2005).
Applying this lemma to the situation of this paper, we have the following relations.
max
tA∈T
min
tB∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC) = min
tB∈T
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC), max
tB∈T
min
tA∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC) = min
tA∈T
max
tB∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC).
max
tA∈T
min
tC∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC) = min
tC∈T
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC), max
tB∈T
min
tC∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC) = min
tC∈T
max
tB∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC).
max
tA∈T
min
tB∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = min
tB∈T
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)),
max
tB∈T
min
tA∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = min
tA∈T
max
tB∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)).
max
tA∈T
min
sC∈S
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)),
max
tB∈T
min
sC∈S
uB(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = min
sC∈S
max
tB∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)),
Further we show the following result.
Lemma 2.
min
tC∈T
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC) = min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC))
= max
tA∈T
min
sC∈S
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = max
tA∈T
min
tC∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC),
and
min
tC∈T
max
tB∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC) = min
sC∈S
max
tB∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC))
= max
tB∈T
min
sC∈S
uB(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = max
tB∈T
min
tC∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC).
Proof. maxtA∈T uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) is the maximum of uA with respect to tA given tB and
sC. Let t˜A(sC) = argmaxtA∈T uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)), and fix the value of tC at
t0C = gC( fA(t˜A(sC), tB, t
0
C), fB(t˜A(sC), tB, t
0
C), sC). (1)
We have
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, t
0
C) ≥ uA(t˜A(sC), tB, t
0
C) = max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)),
where maxtA∈T uA(tA, tB, t
0
C
) is the maximum of uA with respect to tA given the value of tC
at t0
C
. We assume that t˜A(sC) = argmaxtA∈T uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) is single-valued. By the
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maximum theorem and continuity of uA, t˜A(sC) is continuous, then any value of t
0
C
can be
realized by appropriately choosing sC given tB according to (1). Therefore,
min
tC∈T
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC) ≥ min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)). (2)
On the other hand, maxtA∈T uA(tA, tB, tC) is the maximum of uA with respect to tA given tB
and tC. Let t˜A(tC) = argmaxtA∈T uA(tA, tB, tC), and fix the value of sC at
s0C = fC(t˜A(tC), tB, tC). (3)
Thus, we have
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, s
0
C)) ≥ uA(t˜A(sC), tB, tC(tA, tB, s
0
C)) = max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC),
where maxtA∈T uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, s
0
C
)) is the maximum of uA with respect to tA given the value
of sC at s
0
C
. We assume that t˜A(tC) = argmaxtA∈T uA(tA, tB, tC) is single-valued. By the
maximum theorem and continuity of uA, t˜A(tC) is continuous, then any value of s
0
C
can be
realized by appropriately choosing tC given tB according to (3). Therefore,
min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) ≥ min
tC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC). (4)
Combining (2) and (4), we get
min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = min
tC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC).
Since any value of sC can be realized by appropriately choosing tC given tA and tB, we have
min
sC∈S
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = min
tC∈S
uA(tA, tB, tC).
Thus,
max
tA∈T
min
sC∈S
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = max
tA∈T
min
tC∈S
uA(tA, tB, tC).
Therefore,
min
tC∈T
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC) = min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)),
=max
tA∈T
min
sC∈S
uA(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = max
tA∈T
min
tC∈T
uA(tA, tB, tC),
given tB.
By similar procedures, we can show
min
tC∈T
max
tB∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC) = min
sC∈S
max
tB∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)),
=max
tB∈T
min
sC∈S
uB(tA, tB, tC(tA, tB, sC)) = max
tB∈T
min
tC∈T
uB(tA, tB, tC),
given tA. 
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3 The main results
In this section we present the following main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. The equilibriumwhen all players choose ti’s is equivalent to the equilibriumwhen
Player C chooses sC and Players A and B choose ti’s as their strategic variables.
Proof. 1. Consider a situation (tA, tB, tC) = (t, t, tC). By symmetry for Players A and B,
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t, tC) = max
tB∈T
uB(t, tB, tC),
and
argmax
tA∈T
uA(tA, t, tC) = argmax
tB∈T
uB(t, tB, tC) ∈ T,
given tC. Let
tC(t) = argmax
tC∈T
uC(t, t, tC).
We assume that it is a single-valued continuous function.
Consider the following function.
t → argmax
tA∈T
uA(tA, t, tC), given tC .
This function is continuous and T is compact. Thus, there exists a fixed point given tC.
Denote it by t∗(tC), then
t∗(tC) = argmax
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗(tC), tC) = argmax
tB∈T
uB(t
∗(tC), tB, tC), given tC .
Now we consider the following function.
t → t∗(tC(t)).
This also has a fixed point. Denote it by t∗ and tC(t
∗) by t∗
C
, then we have
t∗ = argmax
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗
, t∗C) = argmax
tB∈T
uB(t
∗
, tB, t
∗
C),
t∗C = argmax
tC∈T
uC(t
∗, t∗, tC).
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗
, t∗C) = uA(t
∗
, t∗, t∗C) = max
tB∈T
uB(t
∗
, tB, t
∗
C) = uB(t
∗
, t∗, t∗C),
and
max
tC∈T
uC(t
∗, t∗, tC) = uC(t
∗, t∗, t∗C).
(tA, tB, tC) = (t
∗, t∗, t∗
C
) is a Nash equilibrium when all players choose ti’s
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2. Because the game is zero-sum,
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC) + uB(t
∗, t∗, tC) + uC(t
∗, t∗, tC) = 0.
By symmetry uA(t
∗, t∗, tC) = uB(t
∗, t∗, tC). Thus,
2uA(t
∗, t∗, tC) + uC(t
∗, t∗, tC) = 0.
This means
2uA(t
∗, t∗, tC) = −uC(t
∗, t∗, tC),
and
2min
tC∈T
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC) = −max
tC∈T
uC(t
∗, t∗, tC).
From this and symmetry for Players A and B, we get
argmin
tC∈T
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC) = argmin
tC∈T
uB(t
∗, t∗, tC) = argmax
tC∈T
uC(t
∗, t∗, tC) = t
∗
C .
We have
min
tC∈T
uA(t
∗, t∗, t∗C) = uA(t
∗, t∗, t∗C) = max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, t∗C),
min
tC∈T
uB(t
∗, t∗, t∗C) = uB(t
∗, t∗, t∗C) = max
tB∈T
uB(t
∗, tB, t
∗
C).
Therefore,
min
tC∈T
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗
, tC) ≤ max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗
, t∗C) = min
tC∈T
uA(t
∗
, t∗, tC) ≤ max
tA∈T
min
tC∈T
uA(tA, t
∗
, tC).
From Lemma 2 we obtain
min
tC∈T
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC) = max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, t∗C) = min
tC∈T
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC) (5)
= max
tA∈T
min
tC∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC) = min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC(tA, t
∗, sC))
= max
tA∈T
min
sC∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC(tA, t
∗, sC)).
3. Let
s0C(t
∗) = fC(t
∗, t∗, t∗C).
Since any value of sC can be realized by appropriately choosing tC,
min
sC∈S
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, sC)) = min
tC∈T
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC) = uA(t
∗, t∗, t∗C). (6)
Thus,
arg min
sC∈S
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, sC)) = s
0
C(t
∗).
(5) and (6) mean
min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC(tA, t
∗, sC)) = min
sC∈S
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, sC)). (7)
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We have
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC(tA, t
∗, sC)) ≥ uA(t
∗, t∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, sC)).
Therefore,
arg min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC(tA, t
∗, sC)) = arg min
sC∈S
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, sC)) = s
0
C(t
∗)
Thus, by (7)
min
sC∈S
max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC(tA, t
∗, sC)) = max
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, s0C(t
∗)))
=min
sC∈S
uA(t
∗, t∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, sC)) = uA(t
∗, t∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, s0C(t
∗))).
Therefore,
argmax
tA∈T
uA(tA, t
∗, tC(tA, t
∗, s0C(t
∗))) = t∗. (8)
By symmetry for Players A and B,
argmax
tB∈T
uB(t
∗, tB, tC(t
∗, tB, s
0
C(t
∗))) = t∗. (9)
On the other hand, because any value of sC is realized by appropriately choosing tC,
max
sC∈S
uC(t
∗
, t∗, tC(t
∗
, t∗, sC)) = max
tC∈T
uC(t
∗
, t∗, tC) = uC(t
∗
, t∗, t∗C).
Therefore,
argmax
sC∈S
uC(t
∗, t∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, sC)) = s
0
C(t
∗) = fC(t
∗, t∗, t∗C). (10)
From (8), (9) and (10), (t∗, t∗, tC(t
∗, t∗, s0
C
(t∗))) is a Nash equilibrium which is equivalent
to (t∗, t∗, t∗
C
).

Interchanging ti and si for each player, we can show
Theorem 2. The equilibriumwhen all players choose si’s is equivalent to the equilibriumwhen
Player C chooses tC and Players A and B choose si’s as their strategic variables.
4 Various examples
Consider a game of relative profit maximization under oligopoly including three firms with
differentiated goods2. It is a three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. The
firms are A, B and C. The strategic variables are the outputs and the prices of their goods. We
consider the following six patterns of competition.
2About relative profit maximization in an oligopoly see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013),
Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka (2013a), Tanaka
(2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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1. Pattern 1: All firms determine their outputs. It is a Cournot case.
The inverse demand functions are
pA = a − xA − bxB − bxC,
pB = a − xB − bxA − bxC,
and
pC = a − xC − bxA − bxB,
where 0 < b < 1. pA, pB and pC are the prices of the goods of Firms A, B and C, and
xA, xB and xC are the outputs of them.
2. Pattern 2: Firms A and B determine their outputs, and Firm C determines the price of
its good.
From the inverse demand functions,
pA = (1 − b)a + b
2xB − bxB + b
2xA − xA + bpC,
pB = (1 − b)a + b
2xB − xB + b
2xA − bxA + bpC,
and
xC = a − bxB − bxA − pC
are derived.
3. Pattern 3: Firms A and C determine their outputs, and Firm B determines the price of
its good.
From the inverse demand functions,
pA = (1 − b)a + b
2xC − bxC + b
2xA − xA + bpB,
pC = (1 − b)a + b
2xC − xC + b
2xA − bxA + bpB,
and
xB = a − bxC − bxA − pB
are derived.
4. Pattern 4: Firms A and B determine the prices of their goods, and Firm C determines its
output.
From the above inverse demand functions, we obtain
pC =
(1 − b)a + 2b2xC − bxC − xC + bpA + bpB
1 + b
,
xB =
(1 − b)a + b2xC − bxC + bpA − pB
(1 − b)(1 + b)
,
and
xA =
(1 − b)a + b2xC − bxC − pA + bpB
(1 − b)(1 + b
.
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5. Pattern 5: Firms A and C determine the prices of their goods, and Firm B determines its
output.
From the above inverse demand functions, we obtain
pB =
(1 − b)a + 2b2xB − bxB − xB + bpC + bpA
1 + b
,
xA =
(1 − b)a + b2xB − bxB + bpC − pA
(1 − b)(1 + b)
,
and
xC =
(1 − b)a + b2xB − bxB − pC + bpA
(1 − b)(1 + b
.
6. Pattern 6: All firms determine the prices of their goods. It is a Bertrand case.
From the inverse demand functions, the direct demand functions are derived as follows;
xA =
(1 − b)a − (1 + b)pA + b(pA + pC)
(1 − b)(1 + 2b)
,
xB =
(1 − b)a − (1 + b)pB + b(pB + pC)
(1 − b)(1 + 2b)
,
and
xC =
(1 − b)a − (1 + b)pC + b(pA + pB)
(1 − b)(1 + 2b)
.
The absolute profits of the firms are
piA = pAxA − cAxA,
piB = pBxB − cB xB,
and
piC = pC xC − cC xC .
cA, cB and cC are the constant marginal costs of Firms A, B and C. The relative profits of the
firms are
ψA = piA −
piB + piC
2
,
ψB = piB −
piA + piC
2
,
and
ψC = piC −
piA + piB
2
.
The firms determine the values of their strategic variables to maximize the relative profits.
We see
ψA + ψB + ψC = 0,
so the game is zero-sum. We assume cA = cB, that is, the game is symmetric for Firms A and
B. However, cC is not equal to cA. Thus, the game is partially asymmetric.
We calculate the equilibrium outputs of the firms in the above six patterns.
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1. Pattern 1
xA =
bcC − 4cA − ab + 4a
(4 − b)(b + 2)
,
xB =
bcC − 4cA − ab + 4a
(4 − b)(b + 2)
,
xC =
bcC + 4cC − 2bcA + ab − 4a
(4 − b)(b + 2)
.
2. Pattern 2
xA =
bcC − 4cA − ab + 4a
(4 − b)(b + 2)
,
xB =
bcC − 4cA − ab + 4a
(4 − b)(b + 2)
,
xC =
bcC + 4cC − 2bcA + ab − 4a
(b − 4)(b + 2)
.
3. Pattern 3
xA =
5b2cC + 4bcC − 3b
3cA + 6b
2cA + 4bcA − 16cA + 3ab
3 − 11ab2 − 8ab + 16a
(4 − b)(1 − b)(b + 2)(3b + 4)
,
xB =
bcC − 4cA − ab + 4a
(4 − b)(b + 2)
,
xC =
7b2cC − 16cC − 3b
3cA + 4b
2cA + 8bcA + 3ab
3 − 11ab2 − 8ab + 16a
(4 − b)(1 − b)(b + 2)(3b + 4)
.
4. Pattern 4
xA =
2b2cC + bcC + 3b
2cA − 2bcA − 4cA − 5ab
2
+ ab + 4a
(1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4))
,
xB =
2b2cC + bcC + 3b
2cA − 2bcA − 4cA − 5ab
2
+ ab + 4a
(1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4))
,
xC =
b2cC − 3bcC − 4cC + 4b
2cA + 2bcA − 5ab
2
+ ab + 4a
(1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4))
.
5. Pattern 5
xA =
3b2cC − b
3cC + 4bcC + 6b
3cA + 16b
2cA − 12bcA − 16cA − 5ab
3 − 19ab2 + 8ab + 16a
(1 − b)(b + 2)(b + 4)(5b + 4)
,
xB =
2b2cC + bcC + 3b
2cA − 2bcA − 4cA − 5ab
2
+ ab + 4a
(1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4)
,
xC =
4b3cC + 7b
2cC − 16bcC − 16cC + b
3cA + 12b
2cA + 8bcA − 5ab
3 − 19ab2 + 8ab + 16a
(1 − b)(b + 2)(b + 4)(5b + 4)
.
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6. Pattern 6
xA =
2b2cC + bcC + 3b
2cA − 2bcA − 4cA − 5ab
2
+ ab + 4a
(1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4)
,
xB =
2b2cC + bcC + 3b
2cA − 2bcA − 4cA − 5ab
2
+ ab + 4a
(1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4)
,
xC =
b2cC − 3bcC − 4cC + 4b
2cA + 2bcA − 5ab
2
+ ab + 4a
(1 − b)(b + 2)(5b + 4)
.
We find that Pattern 1 is equivalent to Pattern 2 (an example of Theorem 1), but it is not
equivalent to Pattern 3, and that Pattern 6 is equivalent to Pattern 4 (an example of Theorem
2), but it is not equivalent to Pattern 5. Pattern 1 (Cournot Pattern) and Pattern 6 (Bertrand)
are not equivalent unless we have cC = cA.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have examined equilibria in a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum
game under various situations. We want to extend the results of this paper to a general
multi-players zero-sum game.
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